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I 
The purpose of this essay is to attempt to explain what has been going 
on politically in Quebec in the past twenty years. If you will, it is a form of 
exegesis; an exercise in the interpretation of the authoritative thought and 
opinion in Quebec. I have in mind the major works of the "Quiet 
Revolution" but particularly the thought of the Parti Québécois as dis-
closed in the various white papers on language policy, the referendum, 
cabinet ministers ' pronouncements, departmental regulations, 
educational guidelines, curricula and legislation. The intention is not to 
engage in wild words, but rather, to maintain a philosophical calm and 
present the argument directly, so as to invite reflection. The purpose is to 
give a bird's eye view rather than a worm's eye view, a form of intellectual 
traffic report as if from a helicopter. 
The level of generalization is of the upper range. The size of concepts 
used will be large but, I hope, not inaccurate or imprecise. The thesis is 
that a distinctive ideology has been and is at work in Quebec, and that an 
essential ideological coherence exists behind post-Duplessis developments. 
I am suggesting that to understand political goings-on in Quebec, we must 
remember Quebec's two major historic characteristics: its colonial legacy 
and its Catholic heritage. Its colonial legacy tied it to Britain and its 
Catholic heritage tied it to France. 
When the "quiet revolutionaries" first decided to engage in revolution, 
they searched for ideas. Obviously, they did not turn to the British or 
French establishments, the custodians of the colonial legacy and the 
Catholic heritage which "oppressed" them. However, the anti-imperial 
circles in Britain and the anti-Catholic revolutionary circles in France sug-
gested themselves as good sources. Much of Quebec's intelligentsia, 
therefore, turned to the ideas which were fashionable in both British and 
French "adversary cultures" after the Second World War. In London this 
was the corpus of British Fabian socialist thought and opinion as it 
evolved between 1890 and 1950. And in Paris it was French "gauchisme", 
a mixture of Marxist conviction and existentialist sentiment, as articulated 
after the war in the cafés along the Left Bank. 
Today's "Pequistes" drank from these wells and imported these ideas. 
Hence, the major thrust of their policy has been to "decolonize" Quebec 
by making it independent, and to completely "de-Catholicize" Quebec by 
making it secular and modern. In order to find and recognize the most 
salient characteristics of this ideology we must consider the following. 
In the March 1975 issue of Commentary there appeared an essay under 
the title "The United States in Opposition", written by Professor Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan of Harvard University.1 Unfortunately, in Quebec, it 
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has not received nearly the attention it deserves. In that essay, Professor 
Moynihan argues that in the 1970's, for the first time, the world felt the 
impact of "what for a lack of a better term I shall call the 'British 
Revolution'."2 He continues, 
"The 'British Revolution' began in 1947 with the granting by 
socialist Britain of independence to socialist India.. .With this began 
the process of 'decolonization' or 'the liquidation of empire'. . .In 
slow, then rapid, order the great empires of the world, with the single 
major exception of the Czarist/Russian Empire, broke up into in-
dependent states."3 
Originally, when founded, the United Nations had 51 member states, 
but by 1975 it had expanded to 138 member states. Eighty-seven new in-
dependent states had joined the U.N. However, 47 (more than half) of 
these new states had previously been part of the British Empire. Professor 
Moynihan continues, 
"These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population and 
resources; but in one respect they hardly varied at all: to a quite 
astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform, having fashioned 
their policies in terms derived from the general corpus of British 
socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly from 1890 to 
1950. The Englishmen and Irishmen, Scotsmen and Welsh, who 
created this body of doctrine and espoused it with such enterprise — 
nay, genius — thought they were making a social revolution in Bri-
tain. And they were; but the spread of their ideology to the furthest 
reaches of the globe, with its ascent to dominance in the highest 
national councils everywhere, gives to the British Revolution the 
kind of worldwide significance which the American and French, and 
then the Russian revolutions possessed in earlier times."'1 
But this twentieth century British Revolution did not attract much atten-
tion. 
"Everyone certainly recognised that new states were coming into ex-
istence out of former European, and indeed mostly British colonies, 
but the tendency was to see them as candidates for incorporation into 
one (American-French) or the other (Russian) of the older 
revolutionary traditions then dominant elsewhere in the world. It 
was not generally perceived that they were in a sense already spoken 
for — that they came to independence with a pre-existing, coherent 
and surprisingly stable ideological base which, while related to both 
the earlier traditions, was distinct from both. . ." 
"In truth, a certain Hegelian synthesis had occurred: on the one hand, 
the 'Minimal State' of the American Revolution; in response the 
'Total State' of the Russian Revolution; in synthesis, the 'Welfare 
State' of the British Revolution."5 
Empire apart, by the end of the Second World War British culture was 
the most influential and most suffused with socialist ideas and attitudes. 
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As George Orwell said, Britain was almost unique in that "there exist(ed) 
in England almost no literature of disillusionment about the Soviet Union. 
There (was) the attitude of ignorant disapproval, and there (was) the at-
titude of uncritical admiration, but very little in between."6 This, of 
course, is evident in recent revelations of widespread British artistocratic 
allegiance and cooperation with the Soviet Union. One has in mind, men 
such as Philby, Burgess and Blunt. . .But back to Moynihan: it was the 
British civil servants, he argues, who brought the doctrine of British 
socialism to the colonies. And what the civil service began, British educa-
tion completed. The colonial (native) élites most always sent their sons to 
study in London. Edward Shils has noted, "The London School of 
Economics was often said to be the most important institution of higher 
education in Asia and Africa".7 
The British New Statesman followed Asian and African graduates after 
they had left Britain and returned home. For example, in her 
autobiography, Beatrice Webb wrote that she and her husband felt, 
"assured that with the School (LSE) as the teaching body, the Fa-
bian Society as a propagandist organization, the London County 
Council as object lesson in electoral success, our books as the only 
elaborate original work in economic fact and theory, no young man 
or woman who is anxious to study or work in public affairs can fail 
to come under our influence."8 
British socialism was part of a movement of opinion which spread in the 
course of the first half of the 20th century to the whole of the British Em-
pire, a domain which covered one-quarter of the earth's surface and which 
Moynihan says, "an inspired cartographic convention had long ago 
decreed be colored pink". What was the content of this British socialism? 
What did British socialists believe in? In answer to this question Samuel 
H. Beer has identified seven major themes in this doctrine.9 
1. British socialists believed in "fellowship", which is a society based on 
brotherhood, participation, and political kindliness. A commitment 
to this kind of fellowship distinguished their political approach. 
2. They were hostile to "private ownership" and argued for the "public 
ownership" of property, wealth and means of production. 
3. They believed in "production for use", and were resentful toward any 
notion of "profit". 
4. Society ought to be increasingly based on the principle of 
"cooperation" and any form of "competition" ought to be dis-
couraged or eradicated. 
5. They were proponents of a "cultural and ethical revolution" which 
would change men's "motives". Motives that had aimed at "in-
dividual benefit" would yield to motive aimed at "common 
benefits". 
6. All productive industry should be under "collective and democratic 
control". 
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7. In their view, the role of government consisted in "comprehensive 
and continuous planning and administration" of society. 
Professor Moynihan has made two general observations about the 
British doctrine. First, it contained a suspicion of, almost a bias against, 
economic development and production, which carried over into those parts 
of the world where British culture held sway. This bias held that there was 
"plenty of wealth" in the world. Hence "profit" was synonymous with 
"exploitation". Therefore, "redistribution of wealth", not production, 
remained central to the ethos of British socialism. Second, the British 
doctrine was anti-American, more anti-American than it was ever anti-
Soviet. America was seen as "quintessentially capitalist". Hence the 
United States was seen to be in a prolonged and profound decline and 
history to be moving in other directions altogether. In short, America was 
the "past"; Russia was the "future". 
But if the new nations absorbed ideas about others from the doctrines of 
British socialism, they also absorbed ideas about themselves. There were 
four such ideas. The master concept was that they all had the "right to in-
dependence". It was most often the socialists who became the principal 
political sponsors of independence in the colonies of the British Empire. 
Two further concepts triangulated and fixed the imported and learned 
political culture of these new nations: the belief (often justified) that they 
were "subject to exploitation" like the "working class" in socialist theory; 
and the belief that they were subject to "ethnic discrimination" cor-
responding to class distinctions in industrial society. Moynihan continues, 
"At root, the ideas of exploitation and discrimination represent a 
transfer to colonial populations of the fundamental socialist asser-
tions with respect to the condition of the European working class, 
just as the idea of independence parallels the demand that the work-
ing class break out of bondage and rise to power.10 
The fourth distinctive characteristic of the British doctrine concerns 
procedure. Wrongs were to be righted by "legislation". The movement 
was fundamentally parliamentarian. British socialists were going to change 
society by statute. No longer was the government going to be simply a 
"nightwatchman". 
Beginning with India in 1947, for the first time in the history of mankind 
a vast empire dismantled itself, piece by piece, of its own systematic ac-
cord. A third of the nations of the world today owe their existence to a 
Statute of Westminster. In short, British socialism taught and the colonial 
élites learned the "politics of resentment" and reparation, and the 
"economics of envy". Professor Moynihan concludes his essay by saying 
"we are witnessing the emergence of a World Order, dominated 
arithmetically (in the U.N.) by countries of the Third World. . .in which 
the U.S. finds itself in opposition". 
My suggestion is that Moynihan's thesis can be fruitfully applied to 
Quebec. Very much of the content, opinion and language of British 




Quebec was and remains an intricate part of the British Empire (now the 
Commonwealth). Many of our present leaders and opinionmakers, such as 
Camille Laurin, J.Y. Morin, Claude Morin, and Jacques Parizeau made 
their trek to London or were subject to the same British intellectual in-
fluences. The credentials cited to prove that we now have the "smartest 
cabinet in the history of Quebec" are degrees from London School of 
Economics, Cambridge or its North American intellectual and ideological 
branch plants such as Harvard and Columbia. Leaders of the Quiet 
Revolution and later often members of the P.Q. have breathed this air and 
borrowed these convictions. 
It is no one but the Quebec intelligentsia which has written Quebec into 
the Third World and articulated Quebec's aspirations in terms of the 
decolonization rhetoric of Asia and Africa. It was the late André 
Laurendeau who characterized the late Maurice Duplessis as "le Nègre 
Roi" (the Negro King). The most popular revolutionary tract in Quebec 
written by Pierre Vallières was called The White Niggers of America. It is 
no accident that René Levesque called the English of Montreal "West-
mount Rhodesians" or the "200 sons of bitches in Westmount". Quebec's 
professors, pundits, politicians, poets — a large segment of its intelligent-
sia — has joined Quebec to the Third World and posited the Third World 
as a model for Quebec. And although the politics and ideology informing 
practice in Quebec is not completely identical to that of the Third World, 
it is more similar to Third World politics than to any other school of 
thought. In the light of this it is useful to ask wherein lies the present con-
flict in Quebec? At what level is the conflict? What do the "two scorpions 
in the bottle" represent? If "two solitudes", what two solitudes? 
I believe the traditional explanation of "two nations warring in the 
bosom of a single state" (Lord Durham) is no longer relevant or satisfying. 
The conflict in Quebec is not between English and French, nor between 
Catholic and Protestant, nor is it between "cultures" in the sense that we 
tend to understand that word. And one of the reasons why it is difficult for 
us to realize this is because the real conflict goes on behind a picket fence 
of euphemism. In a sense, the jargon and euphemism is intended to 
obstruct disclosure. If the conflict is not between "cultures" in the 
traditional sense of that term then perhaps it is between "cultures" in a 
new sense of that term. To better understand this I draw attention to 
another essay which deserves our serious attention. 
In the October 1980 Encounter there appeared an essay by Roger San-
dall, "From Arnold to Anthropology"." There Sandall shows the evolving 
definitions of "culture" and alerts us to the current use and misuse ofthat 
term. Sandall argues that from Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) to contem-
porary anthropology the word "culture" has acquired three distinct mean-
ings. 
First, Matthew Arnold gave us a subjective evaluative and prescriptive 
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definition of "culture ' in the sense of "high culture" of "refinement". 
Culture, Arnold said, was "the best knowledge, the best ideas of their 
time" and that "men of culture are the true apostles of equality".12 Then, 
in 1948, T.S. Eliot equated "culture" with "religion". According to Eliot 
"the best that had been thought and said" and the "most exemplary con-
duct" in traditional societies was embodied in the societies' religion. 
Because, claimed Eliot, "religion addressed itself to questions and 
problems of living and provided answers to life from the cradle to the 
grave", therefore, the fullest and most elaborate expression of the culture 
of a people is contained in its religion.13 Thirdly, modern anthropologists 
still further expanded the definition of "culture". Modern anthropology 
gave us a "scientific" descriptive and "neutral" definition. "Culture" was 
broadened to include the "whole way of life, the inherited manners, 
customs, styles" or the whole repertoire of answers to the problems of 
living.14 
In traditional societies, such as pre-Quiet Revolution Quebec, the 
source of answers to the problems of living tended to be their religion 
which in the case of Quebec was Roman Catholicism. However, in a 
society that is rapidly modernizing and hence secularizing, the authority of 
its source of answers, religion, tends to wane. But problems continue, so 
other sources of answers have to be found. Therefore, with the passing of 
traditional society and the waning of traditional religion, modern secular 
ideologies tend to become sources of answers. Ideology tends to inform 
people, and so the "culture" in such a society often begins to increasingly 
resemble some ideology. In an important sense then, the ideology of a 
secular society becomes its culture. This is particularly the case with com-
plete ideologies which provide a total set of answers and which are com-
plete and coherent systems of thought. Thus in a modern secular society 
such complete ideologies fulfill the same function as T.S. Eliot ascribed to 
religion in traditional society. 
Roger Sandall says the Left has realized this new function of ideology in 
a secular society and has consciously appropriated the word "culture" as 
an euphemism for their own ideology.15 What socialism and Marxism sug-
gest is considered "humane", "just", "decent" and "wise". What critics of 
socialism and Marxism suggest is considered the opposite. The proposi-
tions of the critics are deemed unsophisticated, "inhumane", "unjust", 
and downright "indecent". In fact, the critics of socialism are maligned by 
being characterized as the so-called "stupid party". Or, as the Russians 
like to say "nekulturny" (uncultured). Very similarly, the word "culture" 
has been captured by the Parti Québécois. 
If we examine social life in Quebec, we see no conflict between 
"cultures", or culture in Matthew Arnold's sense of the word. There is no 
conflict between "the best that has been thought and said." There is no 
conflict between the language of Shakespeare and the language of 
Molière. There is no conflict between English and French. But there is 
conflict along another axis, the axis of ideology disguised as "culture". 
The conflict is between the thought and language of Marx, Lenin, Sartre, 
Gramsci, and Althusser on the one hand and the thought and language of 
Adam Smith, Mill, Camus, Hayek, Aron, and Revel on the other. It is a 
conflict between two repertoires of secular answers to the problems of liv-
ing. To paraphrase Arthur Koestler, it is two intellectual worlds locked in 
combat. And this is the present situation in modern Quebec. In contem-
porary Quebec the real conflict is between the "old left" and what has now 
begun to be called the "new right". Unfortunately, this conflict, if not ac-
tively disguised, remains undisclosed. 
The Italian thinker Vilfredo Pareto has said that social change is usually 
limited to the displacement of a ruling élite by a more dynamic élite. This 
is called his theory of the "circulation of élites".16 And what often makes a 
new élite "dynamic" is a new ideology. In this sense, Pareto's theory helps 
our understanding of the "Quiet Revolution" in Quebec and our present 
predicament. 
In the post-war period, particularly the 1950's, in opposition to the con-
servative content of "Duplessisme" Quebec had witnessed the emergence 
of a new clerical and lay intelligentsia spawned under the intellectual 
guidance of men such as Abbé Groulx, Archibishop Charbonneau (of the 
Asbestos strike), Père George-Henri Levesque of Laval University, Frère 
Untel, and other Quebec variants of what have come to be called "worker-
priests". That Cardinal Leger abandoned his episcopal throne and left 
Quebec in order to work among lepers in Africa may very well be symp-
tomatic of this climate of opinion in Quebec. 
The pattern of perception, the array of convictions and the corpus of 
thought and opinion among this new intelligentsia amounted to a fun-
damental antagonism to Quebec's (and to an extent Canada's) social, 
economic and political systems. They became Quebec's men of the Left. 
And their ideology was remarkably similar to British socialism. Gradual-
ly they began using the vocabulary of Fabian anti-imperialism and the lex-
icon of decolonization. Having arrived at a different conclusion about the 
fundamental aims of politics they became discontented. They wanted 
something called "social change". No longer content with being a "loyal 
opposition" in an evolutionary, gradualist, political process, they inflated 
their complaints to systemic proportions. Their stance ended up 
amounting to an attack on the fundamental structure of our social, 
economic and political systems. They arrived at having both feet planted 
within the boundaries of what Lionel Trilling called the "adversary 
culture" of leftist intellectuals who are unfriendly toward the ideals of 
western liberalism, democracy and capitalism.17 As the late Ortega y Gas-
sett observed in Meditations on Quixote about comparable people in the 
1930's in Spain, they confronted Socrates (political reason, moderation 
and wisdom) with Don Juan (political emotion, romance and seduction). 
This new elite found its organized expression in the formation of the 
Parti Québécois. And although one often heard the Parti Québécois 
described as "separatist", rarely were we reminded that it was also a 
"socialist" party. Using a nationalist and "liberationist" rhetoric, in the 
long run the Parti Québécois pursues what are fundamentally socialist 
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aims. This is apparent in their constant tendency to nationalize, collectivi-
ze, centralize and bureaucratize. It is apparent in their uninterrupted 
record of concentrating power in the state and elaborating the jurisdiction 
of the state. The P.Q.'s model for modernizing or de-Duplessifying 
Quebec is in this sense essentially borrowed from what has been called the 
Third World (south) "opposition" to the developed nations (north). 
However, the Parti Québécois is not exclusively indebted to British 
socialism. There is also a distinctly un-Fabian tone to their ideology and 
politics. 
I l l 
Quebec's colonial legacy and its Catholic heritage are tightly linked to 
the two most fundamental processes going on in contemporary Quebec. 
These two commanding processes are: "decolonization" as evidenced on 
the one hand by Quebec's separatism and on the other by Canada's patria-
tion of the constitution; and secondly, "secularization" of which there are 
many examples, the most recent being the government's plan to 
"deconfessionalize" the Catholic and Protestant school boards. Intelligent 
discussion of Quebec politics without cognizance of the processes of 
"decolonization" and "secularization" is impossible. 
Neither of these two processes ever occur naturally or spontaneously. In 
fact these processes are suggested and introduced into societies by active, 
thinking and committed men and women who thereby make their entrance 
upon the historical stage. Nor are "decolonization" and "secularization" 
so-called "empty processes". Both are guided and informed by a set of 
values, a corpus of thought and opinion or a system of ideas. Each of these 
processes therefore has or assumes a distinctive intellectual content. 
As has been suggested, Quebec's colonial legacy has made available to 
Quebec the corpus of British socialist thought and opinion as it was 
evolved between 1890 and 1950. As in other parts of the old British Empire 
the process of "decolonization" in Quebec has been informed by the bor-
rowed and imported ideas of British socialism. 
Similarly, Quebec's French Catholic heritage, which is now being dis-
mantled and substituted with "secularism", has turned it toward contem-
porary France and those ideas most talked about on the Left Bank in Paris 
since the end of the Second World War. Hence, the process of 
"secularization" (or "de-Catholicization") is enchanced by a unique ag-
gregate of Marxist opinion and existentialist enthusiasm, popularized by 
Jean-Paul Sartre, which Raymond Aron has aptly called French 
"gauchisme". 
The connection between French "gauchisme" and the policies and prac-
tices of the Parti Québécois requires more elaboration than is possible 
here, but let us suffice to say there exists an intriguing link between 
traditionally Catholic societies, Marxist thought, and modernization. On 
the surface (and in the public imagination), Catholicism and Marxism are 
"enemies". However, the matrix, categories and form of Catholic and 
Marxist thought are highly similar. Often in Catholic countries the process 
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of "secularization" assumes a distinctly Marxist form, flavor and content. 
It is no accident that Marxism tends to be more widespread and Marxist 
parties tend to be more popular in Catholic Europe than in Protestant 
Europe. The largest and most influential communist parties in Europe are 
in Catholic Italy, France, Spain and Portugal. 
Marxism is also more widespread in Catholic America than in Protes-
tant America. As in the "Old World" so in the "New World": Marxism is 
more popular in Catholic Latin America, where Catholicism befriends 
Marxism in the so-called "liberation theology" movement, and in 
Catholic Quebec where priests and teaching brothers first sermonized on 
the "new sociology" and the "new social thought", than it is in Protestant 
America. The most suggestive interpretation of the origins of the "Quiet 
Revolution" among Canadian historians is that it was spawned in the 
bosom of Quebec's Catholic Church by clerics such as Abbé Groulx, Père 
George-Henri Levesque. Archbishop Charbonneau and Frère Untel.18 In 
today's Quebec, the most significant aspects of French Canada's intellec-
tual life and political discussion is the interesting mix of imported British 
socialist opinion and French "gauchiste" thought. 
Clearly, any discussion of an imported French "gauchisme", Marxism 
or Eurocommunism in Quebec should not suggest the "communism of the 
Bolshevik Revolution". The French "gauchisme" brought to Quebec is 
mainly the communism of the Fourth Internationale. It is the so-called 
"legitimate" communism, the "communism with a human face" as ar-
ticulated by Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Raymond Williams, and 
others. It is the communism of the "historic compromise" of Marxism 
(with its traditional principle of "dictatorship of the proletariat") with 
bourgeois democracy. 
The intellectual father of this Marxism was Antonio Gramsci of Italy 
who, by 1968, had become the guru and darling of the French intelligentsia 
in Paris, exactly the same time the eventual founders of the Parti 
Québécois were learning their lessons and struggling to devise their plat-
form and strategy.19 And they did learn their Gramsci. 
The Parisian Left Bank intelligentsia of the 1960's and 1970's con-
sidered Antonio Gramsci as "the Lenin of today" or "the Lenin of the Oc-
cident". As such, his thought had a great influence on a number of Marxist 
thinkers, expecially Louis Althusser, Europe's foremost Marxist 
philosopher who was widely read at the University of Quebec at Montreal 
and by the founders and counsellors of the Parti Québécois. Gramsci's ma-
jor contribution to Marxist theory was his modification of the doctrine of 
"dictatorship of the proletariat". Instead of "dictatorship" he proposed 
the concept of "hegemony" and in place of the "proletariat" he argued for 
a "new historical bloc" of intellectuals, labor leaders, students and 
workers.20 
There are several other respects in which Gramsci "softened and 
humanized Leninism". First, he urged Marxists to stop paying exclusive 
attention to economics and "economic determinism", the so-called 
"substructure" of society. He stressed the social importance of ideas, con-
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viction and values as agents of social change and revolution. Second, 
rather than arguing for the destruction of the bourgeoisie as a class (as the 
classical Marxist-Leninists did) Gramsci argued for the destruction of the 
bourgeoisie's "hegemony" over a society's "culture". He told Marxists 
not to preach the destruction of the bourgeoisie but the destruction of the 
bourgeoisie's prestige, influence and "authority". In other words, destroy 
the authority and credibility of the bourgeoisie's repertoire of answers to 
the problems of living. Third, he taught the Marxists to consider their 
party not as an instrument of one man or one "personality" as was the 
case with Lenin and Stalin, but as a Machiavellian sly and foxy "Prince 
Collectif. Fourth, Gramsci urged them not to demand a "monopoly of 
power". Theoretically he was against a "single party state". The com-
munist party should work and aim for simply a "controlling or leading 
role". Fifth, he taught not to "dictate", but rather to "develop councilism" 
and the "appearance" of bourgeois democracy. Gramsci had disdain for 
compulsion and command and proposed the development and articulation 
of what he called the "strategy of consent". Finally, Gramsci told Marx« 
ists to "capture the culture" of the society. Capturing the culture meant 
providing society and all its problems with a complete repertoire of 
answers consistent with Marxist-Leninist thought. Only then would 
Marxist-Leninism win people's allegiance, loyalty and gain authority. In 
order to achieve this Marxists would have to go on a "long march" 
through the institutions, from the kindergartens to the press. 
Lenin taught the party to first "capture the state" and then remake 
society and its culture according to the New Order. The state would create 
the New Soviet man. Gramsci, the new mentor of Marxist-Leninists 
taught the opposite; "capture the culture" and then the state will fall into 
your hands like a ripe fruit. 
In light of this, any observer of Quebec politics over the past decade or 
so cannot fail to see the uncanny resemblance between Gramsci's theory 
and the political practice of the Parti Québécois. There can be little doubt 
that the Parti Québécois has been advised by counsellors who have 
thoroughly read and have liberally borrowed from Lenin, Trotsky and 
Gramsci — without any acknowledgements. 
IV 
The most blatant example of intellectual borrowing is the Parti 
Québécois' keystone doctrine of "sovereignty-association". Let us briefly 
examine the origin of this conception. "Sovereignty-Association" is a 
Marxist notion in a number of respects. First, it posits two logical op-
posites. Two contradictory notions are joined by a hyphen. Most 
Quebecers were at first confused by it, but then everyone conceded that it 
was a crafty and "original" ploy. 
However, the positing of logical opposites has a long history and many 
precedents in western thought, the most recent example of which is Marx-
ism. It is at the center of Marxist reasoning or so-called "dialectical 
logic". "Sovereignty-association" is consistent with this Marxian predilec-
tion for dualiste thinking. No one is more renowned than Marxist 
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philosophers for the celebration of "conflict" between two opposites. We 
are indebted to them for our awareness of the "struggle" between the 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, capitalism and communism, rich and poor, 
developed and underdeveloped, East and West, North and South. Similar-
ly, Sovereignty and Association. In this sense "sovereignty-association" 
emanates from the forms of classical Marxism. 
Secondly, "sovereignty-association" can be justified by the most recent 
developments in Marxist theory, because it echoes the "historic com-
promise" between Marxism and Democracy. The doctrine of "historic 
compromise" teaches that two logically irreconcilable concepts can live in 
"historic" if not "logical" harmony. So although "sovereignty" is logical-
ly irreconcilable with "association", "sovereignty-association" can live in 
historic conciliation. And if one finds that intellectually disconcerting then 
all one has to do is abandon bourgeois linear logic and learn to reason 
"dialectically". In short, learn to adhere to two contradictory notions 
about the same thing at the same time. 
In addition to this general resemblance of "sovereignty-association" to 
Marxist canons, there is the evidence of the doctrine's immediate pedigree. 
To see this we must read the three major essays on the "nationalities 
question" which Vladimir Ilyich Lenin wrote between January 1902 and 
July 1916 on the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution.21 
In these essays Lenin promised to nations the "right to self-
determination" and explained how this right was to be historically under-
stood. Lenin's view was that the "right to self-determination" of nations 
existed only during the last stages of capitalism (and imperialism) on the 
eve of the socialist revolution. He rejected the argument that the "right to 
self-determination" could mean "cultural autonomy" (as argued by Bauer 
and Renner) and insisted that it meant "political separation" and the "for-
mation of a national state".22 On the question of strategy he likened 
political separation (or the formation of a national state) to "divorce" and 
cited the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905, by a national "referen-
dum" as an example.23 
Therefore, according to the Marxist-Leninist theory of history, the self-
determination, independence or sovereignty for a colonized nation is in-
evitable in the last stage of the capitalist epoch. On the other hand, volun-
tary federation or association is possible only in the following socialist 
epoch. This is the only context within which the doctrine of "sovereignty-
association" and its real implications can be properly understood. 
In addition to their indebtedness to Marxist doctrine for the com-
manding themes of their policy there is the evidence of their political eti-
quette which is also typically leftist. All Quebeckers will remember that 
when an opposition member gave evidence that there was an exodus of 
business from Montreal, he was accused by a P.Q. minister of "political 
destabilization". When the leader of the Opposition spoke on the subject 
to the economy during a recent by-election he was accused by the Premier 
of "intellectual terrorism". When a private and respected company 
decided to move its head office from Montreal it was accused of being a 
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"bad corporate citizen". When the anglophone minority expressed its in-
dependent opinion it was admonished for living in a "cultural ghetto", its 
secret ballots described as a "captive vote", and their legitimacy dis-
credited. Citizens expressing scepticism about the P.Q. and its policies are 
lectured to enter the "mainstream" of Quebec life and stop sabotaging 
"social change" and "social justice" in Quebec. When minorities disagree 
with party policy the Minister of Culture, a psychiatrist, diagnoses them as 
being "abnormal". The party line is always described as "normal" and it 
is implied that dissidents are deviants from this "norm". 
Let me conclude with a brief reiteration. The political convictions and 
conduct of the Parti Québécois highly resemble the opinions of British Fa-
bian socialism such as "fellowship", "hostility to private ownership", 
"resentment toward profit", "emphasis on cooperation", belief in a 
"cultural revolution", "collective control" and government "planning" 
and regulation. It is also British socialism which taught the colonial élites 
of the empire to believe they were subject to "ethnic discrimination" and 
economic "exploitation" and therefore had a "right to independence". On 
the other hand the Parti Québécois has also been borrowing liberally from 
French "gauchisme" à la Gramsci, particularly the notions of 
"hegemony" and "the new historical bloc" which is to "capture the 
culture" by a "strategy of consent". And finally, the raison d'être of the 
Parti Québécois' existence which is "sovereignty-association" is based on 
the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of "historical epochs" and has been vir-
tually lifted from Lenin's essays on "nationality policy" beginning with the 
metaphor of divorce, the lexicon of normality and abnormality, and ending 
with the strategy of the "referendum". 
Lord Durham's "two nations warring the bosom of a single state" may 
have been the case in 1840. But traditional 19th century "nationalism" ex-
plains much less about contemporary Quebec than does the imported mix-
ture of British socialism and French "gauchisme". Traditionally French 
Canadian nationalism was tempered by Catholicism. Catholicism gave 
nationalism some universal international, all-men-are-brothers content. In 
contemporary Quebec French Canadian nationalism has been de-
Catholicized and subsequently Marxified. Today socialism and 
"gauchisme" give French Canadian nationalism its specific content, shape 
and direction and as such have accented its divisive exclusionist tendencies. 
To those who would be surprised by my coupling of nationalism and 
socialism in this way or who have learned to see "facism" and "nazism" 
on one side and "socialism" and "communism" on the other (as they were 
in World War II) I suggest they are mistaken. Both "fascism" and 
"nazism" were essentially and distinctly socialist movements. Their 
socialist content made them inherently tyrannical and illiberal. And the 
war between "nazism" and "communism" was not a war between two op-
posites. It was not a war between a negative and positive. Opposites at-
tract. Only similarités conflict. And the similarity between "National 
Socialism" and "Socialism in One Country" was their socialist content. 
But this is another question. 
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There is a recognizable pattern to the economic and political posture of 
the Third World and the Parti Québécois of which the central reality is, 
". . .that their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist ideologies are in fact 
themselves the last stage of colonialism. These are imported ideas 
every bit as much as the capitalist and imperialist ideas to which they 
are opposed. The sooner they are succeeded by truly indigenous 
ideas, the better off the former colonies will be."24 
The conflict in Quebec today is between two ideological tendencies and 
postures, not between two peoples. It is a collision of two visions of the 
world and future: the liberal-democratic vision of the world and the world 
according to the Parti Québécois. 
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